Adequality, or παρισóτης (parisotēs) in the original Greek of Diophantus 1 , is a crucial step in Fermat’s method of finding maxima, minima, tangents, and solving other problems that a modern mathematician would solve using infinitesimal calculus. The method is presented in a series of short articles in Fermat’s collected works (1891, pp. 133–172). The first article, Methodus ad Disquirendam Maximam et Minimam 2 , opens with a summary of an algorithm for finding the maximum or minimum value of an (...) algebraic expression in a variable A. For convenience, we will write such an expression in modern functional notation as f (a). 3 The algorithm can be broken up into six steps in the following way:Introduce an auxiliary .. (shrink)

An important contribution of Alan Patten’s Equal Recognition is the conception of neutrality that grounds his defence of minority cultural rights. Built in to his conception of neutrality of treatment is a notion of ‘fairness’ whose effect is to provide an upfront, across the board limitation on the demands cultural minorities may legitimately make on the rest of society. There must be limits on the duty to accommodate, but it obscures more than it illuminates to build this into the content (...) of the right to equal recognition itself. We see more clearly what is at stake in these conflicts by articulating the value of self-determination independently and taking account of necessary limits to its satisfaction as part of a second-stage analysis of what duties may be claimed and against whom. Familiar principles of discrimination law exemplify this alternative model. This presents the interest in self-determination more robustly, while acknowledging that the claims of duty arising out of it are defeasible. The result is a more flexible and nuanced exploration of the complex moral issues involved when fundamental interests clash. (shrink)

Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera showed, a quarter century ago, that any agent who regards a fellow agent as a peer--in particular, defers to the fellow agent's prior credences in the same way that she defers to her own--and updates by split-the-difference is prone to diachronic incoherence. On the other hand one may show that there are special scenarios in which Bayesian updating approximates difference splitting, so it remains an important question whether it remains a viable response to ``generic" peer update. (...) We look at arguments by two teams of philosophers against difference splitting. (shrink)

In many countries around the world, people who inject drugs remain at high risk of HIV acquisition not because effective forms of prevention are unknown, nor because they find effective prevention undesirable, but because those in charge, mainly politicians but also bureaucrats, find evidence-based practice politically unacceptable. The evidence for preventive efficacy of harm reduction strategies, most prominently needle and syringe programmes but also treatment programmes such as opiate substitution, is irrefutable.1 However, political responses to drug use issues are varied (...) and complex, so the will to implement appropriate harm reduction programmes in the interests of public health remains lacking in too many jurisdictions. As a consequence, the discussion of how best, in the context of research, to reduce HIV incidence in populations of people who inject drugs but are not offered comprehensive access to known prevention strategies is—tragically—an important one. Dawson et al 2 focus on access to sterile injecting equipment and recognise that this should remain the ‘default’ standard of prevention for HIV prevention trials involving people for whom injecting drug use is the primary risk factor for HIV acquisition. ‘Standard of prevention’ means the background or minimal HIV risk reduction interventions offered to all participants in a trial, regardless of what other investigational interventions they are assigned to receive. The standard of prevention concept is grounded in the ethical principle of beneficence—that researchers and sponsors are obliged to maximise benefits and minimise risks to participants in research studies.3 …. (shrink)

During the last 40 years, political philosophers have made important advances in our understanding of why equality is valuable, and what kind of equality is important. This article summarizes the development of these ideas, in particular, the contributions of John Rawls, Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, Richard Arneson, and G. A. Cohen. It shows how these ideas have filtered into economic thinking in the conceptualization of equality of opportunity. It concludes with a brief discussion of how (...) these ideas might be extended to evaluate intergenerational and global distributions of income or welfare. (shrink)

Nanomedicine applications are an extension of traditional pharmaceutical drug development that are targeting the most pressing health concerns through improvements to diagnostics, drug delivery systems, therapeutics, equipment, surgery and prosthetics. The benefits and risks to the individual have been extrapolated to include broader societal impacts of nanomedicine with concerns extending to inequitable distribution of benefits accruing to developed, or North countries, rather than developing, or South countries. Analysis reveals a great deal of overlap between the North and South's most serious (...) health priorities which kill millions each year. A significant amount of nanomedicine research activity is also underway for the most pressing South country-specific health concerns. Nanomedicine development promises profound breakthroughs for both North and South countries; however, the existing inequities in pharmaceutical drug development, patenting, access and delivery remain significant barriers for South countries. (shrink)

Bilingualism is a valuable tool that enriches and facilitates cultural, social and lived experiences for autistic and non-autistic people alike. Research consistently finds no negative effects of bilingualism and highlights the potential for positive effects across cognitive and socio-cultural domains for autistic and non-autistic children. Yet parents of autistic children remain concerned that bilingualism will cause delays in both cognitive and language development and are still frequently advised by practitioners to raise their child monolingually. Evidently, findings from research are not (...) reflected in practice or subsequent advice, and it is essential to identify ways to ensure equal access to additional language learning. We briefly summarise the existing literature on bilingualism and autism, considering perspectives from the bilingual autistic community, and experimental research. We identify the most pertinent barriers to participation for autistic bilingual children in terms of familial, clinical and educational perspectives. We propose novel solutions to promote additional language learning and suggest changes to practice that will contribute to an evidence base for families and practitioners. This commentary makes innovative recommendations at both the individual and societal level to ensure that autistic bilingual people have equal rights and opportunities to language learning and are optimally supported in accessing them. (shrink)

In public reason liberalism, equal respect requires that conceptions of justice be publicly justifiable to relevant people in a manner that allocates to each an equal say. But all liberal public justification also excludes: e.g., it accords no say, or a lesser say, to people it deems unreasonable. Can liberal public justification be aligned with the equal respect that allegedly grounds it, if the latter calls for discursive equality? The chapter explores this challenge with a focus on Rawls-type political (...) liberalism. I suggest that political liberalism’s commitment to equal respect can cohere with the standing of the unreasonable in public justification if that standing is not impermissibly unequal in discursive purchase. I then consider one candidate view of the permissibility of purchase inequality. On this broadly sufficientarian view, purchase inequality is permissible provided relevant people have standing of enough purchase to be able to avoid relevant bads. A plausible variant of this view suggests that political liberalism’s commitment to equal respect does not cohere with the discursive standing of the unreasonable. It emerges that where liberal public justification accords actual people discursive respect but relevantly idealizes at least around its fringes, the permissibility of purchase inequality must be a central concern. (shrink)

Taking equality seriously means that we ought to consider the ways in which persons are not only unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged from the start – e.g., through genetic inheritance, wealth, or a parent’s educational background – but also how opportunities and rewards that result from these basic inequalities are later exacerbated in the distribution of goods and opportunities. The basic point of equality as a normative principle is not that everyone have similar things or achieve similar outcomes, that (...) would be undesirable both for reasons having to do with individual liberty as well as social need. (shrink)

This volume brings the remarkable writings of Russian liberal thinker Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin to English-language readers for the first time. The collection includes key essays in which Chicherin addresses the central political and social problems that confronted Russia from 1855 to the opening years of the twentieth century. Chicherin’s ideological alternatives to the Bolshevik plan for revolutionary transformation of Russia not only provide valuable historical insights, but also are highly relevant to current political discussion of liberalism in Russia and in (...) the West. In a comprehensive introduction to the book, G. M. Hamburg discusses the development of Chicherin’s thought and places it in historical context. Chicherin, Hamburg says, was a powerful and sophisticated but often misunderstood defender of civil and political rights. Like his fellow liberals in Russia, Chicherin was heavily influenced by German idealism and particularly by Hegel. He departed from many, however, in favoring a market economy and advocating that reform efforts be tailored to local conditions and traditions. In this collection Chicherin explores such contemporary issues as the abolition of serfdom, Russian education, and the need for a constitution. He also tackles broad philosophical problems—the nature of liberty and equality, styles of political discourse—and comments on such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, More, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Hegel, and Marx. (shrink)

The nature of basic equality (what it is that makes us all equals) can have implications not only for the question of the currency of egalitarian justice but also for that of its . The latter question is raised by G. A. Cohen in his critique of John Rawls's theory of justice. In this paper I argue that Rawlsian liberals might provide an answer to Cohen's critique by establishing two distinct kinds of basic equality, thus providing a of (...) basic equality. A first kind of basic equality gains moral relevance in the context of respectful relations between individuals, and establishes egalitarian duties between them. A second kind of basic equality gains moral relevance in the context of respectful relations between the state and individual citizens, and establishes egalitarian duties of the state toward citizens. The strength of Cohen's critique depends, in part, on the fact that Rawls identified only one kind of basic equality while at the same time wishing to defend a dualist account of individual and state duties. (shrink)

This is a three-part study and defense of the idea of basic human equality. (This is the idea that humans are basically one another's equals, as opposed to more derivative theories of the dimensions in which we ought to be equal or the particular implications that equality might have for public policy.) Part (1) of the paper examines the very idea of basic equality and it tries to elucidate it by considering what an opponent of basic human (...) equality (e.g. a philosophical racist) might hold. It explores the idea of there being no morally significant fundamental divisions among humans (of the kind that some people insist on as between humans and others animals). Part (2) considers whether basic human equality must be based on some descriptive similarity among us (naturalistic or metaphysical); it considers the positions of a number of thinkers who have denied this. Part (3) considers John Rawls's conception of basic equality in terms of range properties. (Being in Ohio is a range property; Columbus and Cincinnati are both equally in Ohio even though even though Columbus is in the center of the state, while Cincinnati is just over the river from Kentucky.) It explores the application of this Rawlsian idea to the descriptive properties that might be thought relevant to human equality. This three part paper is a rather technical philosophical exploration. And it is just a beginning; we need much more work on the idea of basic equality. Some of the energy that has gone into discussions of equality as a policy aim (e.g. in the Dworkin/Sen literature or in the literature surrounding Rawls's Difference Principle) needs to be devoted to this more fundamental conception. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Equal Freedom and Utility: Herbert Spencer’s Liberal Utilitarianısm by David WeinsteinDaniel PalmerDavid Weinstein. Equal Freedom and Utility: Herbert Spencer’s Liberal Utilitarianısm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii + 235. Cloth, $69.95.Herbert Spencer, though influential and widely read in the nineteenth century, has been largely neglected by contemporary philosophers. David Weinstein argues that this neglect is unjustified, and that Spencer’s moral and political thought deserves the same attention (...) that has been afforded to Spencer’s contemporary John Stuart Mill. The comparison with Mill is particularly important for Weinstein. Indeed, he claims that, like Mill, Spencer was a liberal utilitarian who attempted to preserve a place for strong moral rights within a broadly utilitarian framework.A large part of Weinstein’s study is devoted to delineating the precise nature of Spencer’s utilitarianism. Weinstein argues that Spencer is both more consistently utilitarian and more systematic than has often been alleged. In the first two chapters he discusses Spencer’s utilitarianism in relation to his metaphysical principles and his account of moral psychology. Weinstein convincingly demonstrates that Spencer’s liberal utilitarianism follows from his views on social evolution. Spencer viewed evolutionary processes as leading to increasing differentiation among phenomena, which implied for Spencer a trend towards greater individuation of persons as societies evolve. Evolutionary principles also led Spencer to view happiness as largely dependent upon the exercise of faculties. Together, these views lend support to what Weinstein sees as the centerpiece of Spencer’s liberal utilitarianism, his principle of equal freedom, or the claim that “each shall have as much liberty to pursue his ends as consists with maintaining like liberties to pursue their ends by others” (38). The increasing individuation of individuals coupled with the dependence of happiness upon the free exercise of our faculties guaranteed for Spencer that the greatest happiness will be generated through the adoption of the principle of equal freedom.Weinstein’s central argument is that Spencer’s moral philosophy offers a distinctive version of indirect utilitarianism. In chapters 3 through 5 he outlines the main contours of Spencer’s liberal utilitarianism and its relevance to contemporary discussions, maintaining that Spencer accepted the utilitarian principle as the ultimate criterion of actions. However, much like Mill, and in reaction to Bentham, he argued that any direct pursuit of the greatest happiness is self-defeating. Spencer’s indirect utilitarianism sought to promote the conditions upon which happiness is founded through the principle of equal freedom. Moral rights were for him merely corollaries of the principle that flesh out its empty formalism, providing the basis for deliberation. Concrete moral rights such as property rights, contract rights, and exchange rights are therefore the basis for our primary obligations and yet find their ultimate justification in the principle of utility.Spencer’s two-tiered account of our moral obligations is thus remarkably similar to Mill’s account of moral rights in Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism. The difference between them concerns the stringency of moral rights. While Mill saw moral rights as important, but ultimately defeasible, Spencer viewed them as indefeasible. While Mill’s position seems more plausible from the utilitarian perspective, Weinstein shows that Spencer’s stronger position must be judged in terms of his beliefs about the exercise of human [End Page 685] faculties. Weinstein correctly shows that if Spencer is wrong, it is not because, as critics have charged, his position is logically inconsistent, but because he held mistaken views about human nature and society.While the heart of Equal Freedom and Utility concerns the relation between utility and moral rights in Spencer’s work, the final two chapters are devoted to metaethics and applied ethics respectively. Weinstein marshals strong textual support to show that Spencer never simply defined the good as happiness and that G. E. Moore’s use of Spencer in Principia Ethica as an example of someone who committed a glaring version of the naturalistic fallacy was not justified. Spencer simply avoided prolonged treatments of such metaethical concerns. In the last chapter Weinstein argues that Spencer’s evolving views on land nationalization reveals both the general nature of Spencer’s derivation of moral rights from the principle... (shrink)

The subject of this essay is political, and therefore social, philosophy; and therefore, ethics. We want to know whether the right thing for a society to do is to incorporate in its structure requirements that we bring about equality, or liberty, or both if they are compatible, and if incompatible then which if either, or what sort of mix if they can to some degree be mixed. But this fairly succinct statement of the issue before us requires considerable clarification, (...) even as a statment of the issue. For it is widely, and in my view correctly, held that some sort of equality is utterly fundamental in these matters. We seek a principle, or principles, that apply to all, are the same for all. In that sense, certainly, equality is fundamental and inescapable. But this is a very thin sort of “equality.” It will almost equally widely be agreed that the principles in question should in some more interesting sense “treat” people equally, e.g., by allotting to all the same set of rights, and moreover, rights that are – again we have to say “in some sense” – nonarbitrary, so that whatever they are, persons of all races, sexes, and so on will have the same fundamental rights assigned to them. Taking this to be, again, essentially uncontroversial, though not without potentially worrisome points of unclarity, it needs, now, to be pointed out that this characterization does not settle the issue that this essay is concerned with. That issue is about economic matters in particular. (shrink)

This article examines, through a theoretical lens, two issues concerning equality under international law thrown up by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War: the equal treatment of belligerents on different sides under international humanitarian law (IHL), which is being contested by revisionist just war theorists, and the unequal treatment of Ukrainians with different genders assigned at birth who are trying to flee Ukraine, which is being contested under international human rights law (IHRL). By examining different conceptions of equality through the (...) lens of social ontology, this article distinguishes between the regulatory focus of IHL on individual agency and the regulatory focus of IHRL on social structures, which directly influence how ‘difference’ and ‘sameness’ are recognized and determined for the purpose of conceptualizing equality. Because of IHL’s focus on individuals, whose agency is limited in war, only highly agential conduct (e.g. targeting civilians) makes a ‘difference’ under IHL. Meanwhile, outside IHL’s regulatory focus, the different causes of states’ participation in war are evened out as the ‘same’ structured positions occupied by different individuals, warranting their same treatment according to belligerent equality. On the other hand, because of IHRL’s focus on social structures, which heavily condition the individuals, structural arrangements make a ‘difference’ under IHRL. Outside IHRL’s regulatory focus, individuals’ different innate characteristics such as sexual characteristics are evened out as the ‘same’ agential quality of being human, warranting their same treatment according to sex equality. The article argues that the contestations about these equality principles find deeper roots in their divergent social ontological visions, the revelation of which can open up new spaces for dialogue on and inquiry into a common social world that grounds the legal conceptions of equality. (shrink)

Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity, but recently there has been a sea-change in thinking about that concept. Shlomi Segall brings together these developments and offers a new account of 'radical equality of opportunity', which removes all obstacles (to one's opportunity-set) that lie outside one's control.

Many scholars have suggested that Aristotle’s famous aphorism ‘treat equals equally, unequals unequally’ is a formal, and thus impractical, theory of equality. This dissertation aims to criticise the popular view that Aristotle’s theory of equality is purely formal and to develop and defend an interpretation which will pay attention to the substantive elements. The first chapter argues that Aristotle provides us with a spectrum from formal to substantive equality. At the formal end, we have the abstract principles (...) of formal fairness and proportionality, while at the substantive end we can find information for the designation of the appropriate variable of comparison between people or treatments in various domains of social interaction. The second chapter argues for an account of commensurability based on Ph. VII.4. I claim that, in any comparison, the term ‘equal’ should be predicated synonymously of the people or treatment compared, while at the same time they should not admit to difference in species; such an account, I suggest, is also compatible with Aristotle’s theory of economic value in EN V.5. The third chapter presents the Aristotelian account of equality in distributions. I focus on Aristotle’s theory of political distribution in Pol. III, where he puts forward two distinct criteria: political capacity and contribution to the polis. I also examine Aristotle’s moderate suggestion for equalisation of property by the means of public property and taxation. The fourth chapter criticises the popular line that Aristotle holds an inconsistent theory of corrective justice, because in EN V.4 he suggests that people should be treated as equal before the law, while in the first lines of EN V.5 he allows for hierarchical considerations. I eliminate this apparent inconsistency by claiming that the former deals with the compensatory, while the latter with the punitive element of corrective justice. The fifth chapter explores the role of equality within the private domain, mainly in the household and in various types of friendship. I propose that Aristotle offers two types of superiority, one based on actuality and a second based on function, which are not mutually exclusive. To summarise, by examining Aristotle’s responses to various problems about equality and hierarchy I conclude that although he possesses the theoretical tools to argue for ‘inalienable’ metaphysical equality of human beings which will make equality an individual entitlement or right, based on his principle of individuation in Metaph. Z.8, he prefers not to utilise this thesis for political purposes. Instead, he reduces equality to justice (inequality is unjust, since it violates principle of formal fairness which is fundamental for justice) and a set of pragmatical considerations (e.g. concord and the optimal outcome for the polis). He prefers to argue that equality or hierarchy of people or treatments is related to, and defined by, the particular institution that we examine. (shrink)

Against the libertarian view, this essay argues that coercion aimed at bringing about a more equal distribution across persons can be morally acceptable. Informal social norms might lead toward equality (or another social justice goal) without coercion. If coercion were unnecessary, it would be morally undesirable. A consequentialist integration of social norms and principles of social justice is proposed. The proposal is provided with a preliminary defense against the non-consequentialist egalitarianism of G.A. Cohen and against liberal criticisms directed against (...) the common ground that Cohen and the proposed consequentialist egalitarianism occupy. Key Words: distributive justice • consequentialism • Lockean rights • prioritarianism • social norms • incentives. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to briefl y examine one of the fundamental assumptions made in contemporary liberal political philosophy, namely that persons are free and equal. Within the contemporary liberal political thought it would be considered very uncontroversial and even trivial to claim something of the following form: “persons are free and equal” or “people think of themselves as free and equal”. The widespread nature of this assumption raises the question what justifies this assumption, are there good reasons (...) for holding it? After establishing some methodological remarks, including a distinction between having freedom-equality and being free-equal and restricting the domain of discussion to include only a subset of all moral questions, namely the questions of political morality, the paper deals with some conceptual issues concerning this assumption of persons as free and equal, such as how do free-and-equal-making properties relate to person-making properties. It then moves on to examine three broad ways the free-and-equal-mak-ing properties could be established. First, necessary property approaches, which take some necessary feature of persons to be what makes them free and equal (e.g. possessing an immortal soul). Second, contingent property approaches, which take some contingent feature of persons to be what makes them free and equal (e.g heir practise of reasoning). Third, agreement based approaches, which take some agreement or contract among persons to be the basis for their being free and equal (e.g. evolutionary emergence of our treatment of others). Strengths and weaknesses of all approaches will be examined. (shrink)

In this paper, I will inquire into the basic assumptions underlying Rawls’s argument for the distribution of resources according to the difference principle. Rawls assumes a ‘social division of responsibility’ between society and individual citizens which implies that society need not compensate its members for differences in welfare that are the result of the relative cost of effecting their conception of the good. Rawls’s basic justification for holding people individually responsible for the costs of effecting their conception of the good (...) is that it may be assumed that they are able to revise their ends in light of their relative costs. I will show that this assumption of the revisability of our ends is incompatible with Rawls’s justification of the first principle of justice, which has to assume that people’s conceptions of the good and the ends and aspirations that are based on them are given. Removing this friction from Rawls’s theory leads to a position about the distribution of resources akin to the idea of equal opportunity for welfare developed by writers like G.A. Cohen and Richard Arneson. However, it differs from their versions because it focuses on the importance of people’s ability to form and pursue some determinate conception of the good. I will sketch the outlines of this position and will try to indicate how it could be implemented as a workable conception of justice. (shrink)

Most laws are ceteris paribus (cp) laws: they say not that all Fs are G but only that All Fs are G all else being equal. Most philosophical accounts of laws, however, have focused on strict laws. This paper considers how some of the standard philosophical problems about laws change when we switch attention from strict to cp laws and what special problems these laws raise. It is argued that some cp laws do not simply reflect the complexity of the (...) world and the limitations of our minds. Correctly interpreted, they reveal the simplicity that underlies the complexity, a simplicity that it is without our cognitive powers to grasp. (shrink)

Next SectionFollowing the influential Gifford and Reith lectures by Onora O’Neill, this paper explores further the paradigm of individual autonomy which has been so dominant in bioethics until recently and concurs that it is an aberrant application and that conceptions of individual autonomy cannot provide a sufficient and convincing starting point for ethics within medical practice. We suggest that revision of the operational definition of patient autonomy is required for the twenty first century. We follow O’Neill in recommending a principled (...) version of patient autonomy, which for us involves the provision of sufficient and understandable information and space for patients, who have the capacity to make a settled choice about medical interventions on themselves, to do so responsibly in a manner considerate to others. We test it against the patient–doctor relationship in which each fully respects the autonomy of the other based on an unspoken covenant and bilateral trust between the doctor and patient. Indeed we consider that the dominance of the individual autonomy paradigm harmed that relationship. Although it seems to eliminate any residue of medical paternalism we suggest that it has tended to replace it with an equally (or possibly even more) unacceptable bioethical paternalism. In addition it may, for example, lead some doctors to consider mistakenly that unthinking acquiescence to a requested intervention against their clinical judgement is honouring “patient autonomy” when it is, in fact, abrogation of their duty as doctors. (shrink)

Equality is at the heart of liberal, democratic political theory. Despite this, there is considerable disagreement about how we should understand equality in the context of liberal politics. Several different conceptions of equality will recommend different and often conflicting policies and institutions. Further, we can expect, in democratic societies, that citizens will disagree on the correct conception of equality. This leads to the diversity problem of equality—there is no one conception of equality that will (...) be acceptable to all citizens. This is compounded by the complexity problem of generating determinate and predictable results in the institutional application of any particular conception of equality. After identifying these problems and looking at G.A. Cohen’s defense of a thoroughly egalitarian conception of politics, I argue in favor of “democratic equality” as a political ideal. (shrink)

Pallikkathayil argues that restrictions on abortion are inconsistent with the usual demands that states place on their citizens. States don't require their citizens to make their bodies available for the protection of other people's interests. Yet, when abortion is restricted, women who can be pregnant are less entitled than other citizens to decide on how their bodies are to be used; then, states fail to treat women as equal before the law. The argument is supposed to hold even if one (...) assumes that fetuses at various stages of development are as morally considerable as (already born) children, and even if, moreover, fetuses have passive citizenship status – that is, if they have claims to state protection. Pallikkathayil's argument comes at excessive theoretical costs, rulling out (a) general duties to help others in the protection of vital interests via relatively non‐burdening donation, e.g. of blood, and (b) plausible although demanding special duties of procreative parents. Nevertheless, I agree with Pallikkathayil's conclusion that existing legal restrictions on abortion violate the state's duty to treat its citizens as equal, and are hence illegitimate; namely, because they fail to hold all procreators ‐ whether or not gestational ‐ equally liable. (shrink)

From the author of the #1 New York Times bestseller On Bullshit, the case for worrying less about the rich and more about the poor Economic inequality is one of the most divisive issues of our time. Yet few would argue that inequality is a greater evil than poverty. The poor suffer because they don't have enough, not because others have more, and some have far too much. So why do many people appear to be more distressed by the rich (...) than by the poor? In this provocative book, the #1 New York Times bestselling author of On Bullshit presents a compelling and unsettling response to those who believe that the goal of social justice should be economic equality or less inequality. Harry Frankfurt, one of the most influential moral philosophers in the world, argues that we are morally obligated to eliminate poverty—not achieve equality or reduce inequality. Our focus should be on making sure everyone has a sufficient amount to live a decent life. To focus instead on inequality is distracting and alienating. At the same time, Frankfurt argues that the conjunction of vast wealth and poverty is offensive. If we dedicate ourselves to making sure everyone has enough, we may reduce inequality as a side effect. But it’s essential to see that the ultimate goal of justice is to end poverty, not inequality. A serious challenge to cherished beliefs on both the political left and right, On Inequality promises to have a profound impact on one of the great debates of our time. (shrink)

Intuitively, moral responsibility requires conscious awareness of what one is doing, and why one is doing it, but what kind of awareness is at issue? Neil Levy argues that phenomenal consciousness—the qualitative feel of conscious sensations—is entirely unnecessary for moral responsibility. He claims that only access consciousness—the state in which information (e.g., from perception or memory) is available to an array of mental systems (e.g., such that an agent can deliberate and act upon that information)—is relevant to moral responsibility. I (...) argue that numerous ethical, epistemic, and neuroscientific considerations entail that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility. I focus in particular on considerations inspired by P. F. Strawson, who puts a range of qualitative moral emotions—the reactive attitudes—front and center in the analysis of moral responsibility. (shrink)

This paper argues that McDowell wrongly assumes that “terror”, Cavell’s reaction to the radical contingency of our shared modes of knowing or our “attunement”, expresses a skepticism that is antinomically bound to an equally unacceptable dogmatism because Cavell rather regards terror as a mood that reveals the “truth of skepticism”, namely, that there is no conclusive evidence for necessary attunement on pain of a category error, and that a precedent for McDowell’s misunderstanding is Hegel’s argument for necessary attunement in a (...) system of knowing, whose refutation Schelling holds it is the “merit of skepticism” to provide. (shrink)

In his target paper, John Welwood tells us that we have to beware of 'spiritual bypassing -- using spiritual ideas and practices to sidestep personal, emotional -- unfinished business--, to shore up a shaky sense of self, or to belittle basic needs, feelings, and develop-mental tasks, all in the name of enlightenment'. It's arguable that there is an equal danger of 'narrative bypassing' -- using the idea of one's life as a narrative to 'sidestep personal, emotional --unfinished business--, to shore (...) up a shaky sense of self -- all in the name of' a good life. (shrink)

Ever since the publication of G. A. Cohen’s essay “If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?” the matter of personal responsibility for the amelioration of economic disadvantage has become a question for egalitarian political philosophers to wrestle with both theoretically and personally. This essay examines “the demands of equality” in light of an egalitarian philosophy that focuses on human flourishing. I consider Cohen’s call for personal commitments to the egalitarian project to show both the power and problems (...) of his approach and propose an alternative view, where individuals’ concern for living well involves an engagement with the demands of equality, but also some respite from its strictures. (shrink)

By any measure, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., led a full and remarkable life. He was tall and exceptionally attractive, especially as he aged, with piercing eyes, a shock of white hair, and prominent moustache. He was the son of a famous father, a thrice-wounded veteran of the Civil War, a Harvard-educated member of Brahmin Boston, the acquaintance of Longfellow, Lowell, and Emerson, and for a time a close friend of William James. He wrote one of the classic works of American (...) legal scholarship, The Common Law, and he served with distinction on the Supreme Court of the United States. He was actively involved in the Court's work into his nineties. In Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, G. Edward White, the acclaimed biographer of Earl Warren and one of America's most esteemed legal scholars, provides a rounded portrait of this remarkable jurist. We see Holmes's early life in Boston and at Harvard, his ambivalent relationship with his father, and his harrowing service during the Civil War. White examines Holmes's curious, childless marriage and he includes new information on Holmes's relationship with Clare Castletown. White not only provides a vivid portrait of Holmes's life, but examines in depth the inner life and thought of this preeminent legal figure. There is a full chapter devoted to The Common Law, for instance, and throughout the book, there is astute commentary on Holmes's legal writings. Indeed, White reveals that some of the themes that have dominated 20th-century American jurisprudence--including protection for free speech and the belief that "judges make the law"--originated in Holmes's work. Perhaps most important, White suggests that understanding Holmes's life is crucial to understanding his work, and he continually stresses the connections between Holmes's legal career and his personal life. For instance, his desire to distinguish himself from his father and from the "soft" literary culture of his father's generation drove him to legal scholarship of a particularly demanding kind. White's biography of Earl Warren was hailed by Anthony Lewis on the cover of The New York Times Book Review as "serious and fascinating," and The Los Angeles Times noted that "White has gone beyond the labels and given us the man." In Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, White has produced an equally serious and fascinating biography, one that again goes beyond the labels and gives us the man himself. (shrink)

In the last decade, a number of studies have been published relating the in media highlighted problems of the Swedish school to the cluster of reforms launched around 1990. It has been pointed out that, e.g., the municipalization of the school, the introduction of a management by objectives as well as an educational system structured by a voucher model, all carried out in the years around 1990, substantially have contributed to the current problems in Swedish schools. As has been shown (...) in a number of studies, the ideas permeating the reforms are not specific to the educational sector, but can be related to other societal reforms aiming at increasing decentralization as well as a further market orientation. (shrink)

The linguistic theory of the Kabbala, as it is explained in the writings of the Kabbalists of the 13th century—or at least basically implied in them—comes to rest upon a combination of the above-mentioned interpretations of the Book of Yetsira with the doctrine of the Name of God as a basis of that language. What is essentially new in this is the way in which the scope and range of a divine language—as understood by the Kabbalists—is brought into unique prominence (...) over and beyond the realm of created man. In the Book of Yetsira there could still be some doubt as to whether the ten Sefiroth and the 22 letters were themselves thought of as created; and as we have seen, there is even considerable evidence in favor of this conception. In the doctrines and teachings of the Kabbalists, however, this is no longer the case. The ten original numbers have become ten emanations of the divine fullness of being. Where these are concerned one can only now talk in terms of creation in a meta-phorical sense. In the Sefiroth of the Kabbalists, God manifests himself in ten spheres or aspects of his activity. The 22 letters are themselves part and parcel of this area; they are configurations of the divine energies, which are themselves grounded in the world of the Sefiroth, and whose appearance in the world either beyond, outside or beneath this realm of the divine emanations is simply a gradual process of de-refinement and an intensified crystallization of those innermost signs of all things, as they correspond to the progressively evolving and increasingly condensed media of the creation. All creation, from the world of the highest angel to the lower realms of physical nature, refers symbolically to the law which operates within it—the law which governs in the world of the Sefiroth. In everything something is reflected—one might just as well say—from the realms which lie in the center of it. Everything is transparent, and in this state of transparency everything takes on a symbolic character. This means that every thing, beyond its own meaning, has something more, something which is part of that which shines into it or, as if in some devious way, that which has left its mark behind in it, forever. The Book of Yetsira was still far removed from this type of interpretation. For the Kabbalists, however, the Sefiroth and the letters, in which the word of God is explained, or which constitute the word of God, were simply two different methods in which the same reality might be represented in a symbolic manner. In other words: whether the process of the manifestation of God, his stepping outside under the symbol of the light, and his diffusion of knowledge and reflection is what is represented, or whether it is to be understood to be the activeness of the divine language, of the self-differentiating word of the creation or even of the self-explanatory name of God. In the last analysis, this, for the Kabbalists, is no more than a question of the choice between symbolic structures which are in themselves equally arranged—the symbolism of light and the symbolism of language. (shrink)

We show that local realism applied to states characterized by a single quantum equally and coherently shared between a number of qubits (so-called W states) produces predictions incompatible with quantum theory. The origin of this incompatibility is shown to originate from the destructive interference of amplitude probabilities associated with nonlocal states, a phenomenon that has no classical analog.

The term “value of life” can refer to life’s intrinsic dignity: something nonincremental and time-unaffected in contrast to the fluctuating, incremental “value” of our lives, as they are longer or shorter and more or less flourishing. Human beings are equal in their basic moral importance: the moral indignities we condemn in the treatment of e.g. those with dementia reflect the ongoing human dignity that is being violated. Indignities licensed by the person in advance remain indignities, as when people might volunteer (...) their living, unconscious bodies for surrogacy or training in amputation techniques. Respect for someone’s dignity is significantly impacted by a failure to value that person’s very existence, whatever genuine respect and good will is shown by wanting the person’s life to go well. Valuing and respecting life is not, however, vitalism: there can be good and compelling reasons for eschewing some means of prolonging life. (shrink)

In recent years, “deliberation” has become the byword of many political theorists, most of whom identify deliberation with reasoned conversation. Among the most forceful advocates of deliberation as conversation are Jürgen Habermas and, to a greater or lesser extent, his successors who style themselves “deliberative democrats.” For them, the more political decision‐making approximates the ideal of a reasoned public conversation among free and equal individuals, the more legitimate and rational it will be. “Outcomes,” they say are democratically legitimate if and (...) only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals. Their deliberative model produces more rational decision‐making, they say, because it conveys information, impels individuals to order their preferences coherently, and by making persons articulate good reasons in public leads them “to think from the standpoint of all involved.”. (shrink)

This study examines Herbert Spencer's social and political thought by way of his principle of equal freedom. This principle reads, "The liberty of each, limited by the like liberty of each, is the rule in conformity with which society must be organized." ;Basically, this study attempts to demonstrate that Spencer was first and foremost an indirect utilitarian and that equal freedom was the central moral rule of his indirect utilitarianism. An attempt is also made to show how Spencer conceived moral (...) rights as derivations of equal freedom. For Spencer, moral rights were substantive specifications of equal freedom. Like their parent principle, they indirectly promoted happiness. Among other things, my analysis of equal freedom and rights endeavors to clarify how Spencer tried to accommodate a theory of stringent moral rights with utility and how negative freedom and virtue can be seen as compatible features of his theory of freedom. These two themes are meant to comprise some of the most promising rewards of this study. ;This study also explores Spencer's ethical naturalism via G. E. Moore's famous criticisms in Principia Ethica and via some of Henry Sidgwick's critical observations. While Moore's discussion is judged unsatisfactory, Sidgwick's analysis is deemed more successful. ;Finally, this study concludes by examining Spencer's theory of freedom and rights in terms of two fundamental moral rights and in terms of Spencer's vision of utopia. (shrink)

How do we know if people are equal? Contemporary philosophers consider a number of issues when determining if the goals of egalitarian distributive justice have been achieved: defining the metric of equality; determining whether the goal is equality, or simply priority or sufficiency; establishing whether there should be conditions, e.g. bad brute luck, for the amelioration of inequality. In all this, most egalitarians contend that what is to be equalized is not people’s actual shares of the good in (...) question, but rather, the opportunities to have such shares. I counter this view with an ‘egalitarian flourishing’ approach that, in seeking to make people equal in actual well-being, takes exception to the role of opportunity in contemporary argument. The flourishing view means a focus on outcomes, on how people live, in order to enable people to live equally flourishing lives. I argue that if we consider the complex dynamics of choice and circumstance, the role of nonmaterial considerations and the ideal of an egalitarian community, equality of opportunity proves to be an inadequate approach to the realization of the egalitarian ideal. (shrink)

In the case of an intellectually disabled patient, the attending physician was restricted from writing a Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) order. Although the rationale for this restriction was to protect the patient from an inappropriate quality of life judgment, it resulted in a worse death than the patient would have experienced had he not been disabled. Such restrictions that are intended to protect intellectually disabled patients may violate their right to equal treatment and to a dignified death.

How were the aims of philosophy and the responsibilities of philosophers conceived in ancient Greece and China? How were the learned elite recruited and controlled; how were their speculations and advice influenced by the different types of audiences they faced and the institutions in which they worked? How was a yearning for invulnerability reconciled with a sense of human frailty? In each chapter of this fascinating analysis ancient Greek and Chinese ideas and practices are used as a basis for critical (...) reflections on the predicaments we continue to face today, with a particular focus on the key Greek ideas of the equal participation of all citizens in the political process, and on the key Chinese one of a dedication to the ideal of the welfare of all under heaven. (shrink)

In 1916, Einstein rederived the blackbody radiation law of Planck that originated the idea of quantized energy one hundred years ago. For this purpose, Einstein introduced the concept of transition probability, which had a profound influence on the development of quantum theory. In this article, we adopt Einstein's assumptions with two exceptions and seek the statistical condition for the thermal equilibrium of matter without referring to the inner details of either statistical thermodynamics or quantum theory. It is shown that the (...) conditions of thermodynamic equilibrium of electromagnetic radiation and the energy balance of thermal radiation by the matter, between any of its two energy-states, not only result in Planck's radiation law and the Bohr frequency condition, but they remarkably yield the law of the statistical thermal equilibrium of matter: the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution. Since the transition probabilities of the modern quantum theory of radiation coincide with their definition in Einstein's theory of blackbody radiation, the presented deduction of the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution is equally valid within the bounds of modern quantum theory. Consequently, within the framework of the fundamental assumptions, the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution of energy-states is not only a sufficient, but a necessary condition for thermal equilibrium between the matter and radiation. (shrink)

In this third paper in a series on stochastic electrodynamics (SED), the nonrelativistic dipole approximation harmonic oscillator-zero-point field system is subjected to an arbitrary classical electromagnetic radiation field. The ensemble-averaged phase-space distribution and the two independent ensemble-averaged Liouville or Fokker-Planck equations that it satisfies are derived in closed form without furtner approximation. One of these Liouville equations is shown to be exactly equivalent to the usual Schrödinger equation supplemented by small radiative corrections and an explicit radiation reaction (RR) vector potential (...) that is similar to the Crisp-Jaynes semiclassical theory (SCT) RR potential. The wave function in this SED Schrödinger equation is shown to have thea priori significance of position probability amplitude. The other Liouville equation has no counterpart in ordinary quantum mechanics, and is shown to restrict initial conditions such that (i) The Wigner-type phase-space distribution is always positive, (ii) in the absence of an applied field, the only allowed solution of both equations is the quantum ground state, and (iii) if a previously applied field is suddenly turned off, then spontaneous transitions occur, with no need for a triggering perturbation as in SCT, until the system is in the ground state. It is also shown that the oscillator energy is a fluctuating quantity that must take on a continuum of values, with average value equal to the quantum ground-state energy plus a contribution due to the applied classical field. (shrink)

Although explanation is widely regarded as an important concept in the study of rational inquiry, it remains largely unexplored outside the philosophy of science. This, I believe, is not due to oversight as much as to institutional resistance. In analytic philosophy it is basic that epistemic rationality is a function of justification and that justification is a function of argument. Explanation, however, is not argument nor is belief justification its function. I argue here that the task of incorporating explanation into (...) the theory of rational inquiry poses a serious challenge to our basic concept of epistemic rationality as well as the a priori method of inquiry that still lies at the heart of analytic philosophy. Specifically, it pushes us toward a much stronger form of naturalism than is generally thought necessary, one in which argument and explanation are recognized as distinct and equally fundamental cognitive processes whose dynamic relationship is one of the central issues in the theory of rationality. (shrink)

This 1990 collection explores one recurrent theme connecting philosophy and politics: the relation between the nature of man and the structure of society. It does so by concentrating on the topical issue of the market economy as an attempt to resolve the clash between individual autonomy and collective action. Beginning with a historical and personal recollection by Enoch Powell and a response by Robert Skidelsky, the volume then provides a forum for political theorists and philosophers to take issue on the (...) fundamental topics of markets and morals; liberal man; and equality and libertarianism. It succeeds equally as a stimulating textbook and a book for the general reader who wishes to understand the philosophical issues arising in a market economy. (shrink)

1. "The map of logic." Comparatively recently, Kant's words to the effect that in the two thousand years since Aristotle logic had made "not a single step forward and, all things considered, it seems to be a fully finished and completed discipline" used to be quoted widely and not unsympathetically. Today, however, there are works about logic in which the listing of logical disciplines runs into the dozens. In this regard the attempt by the American logician N. Rescher to compile (...) a diagram or "map of logic," in which the list of the branches of logic takes up several pages, is noteworthy. Also characteristic is the following statement by one of the major modern representatives of mathematical logic, S. Kleene: "Since the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries by Lobachevsky and Bolyai , it has become clear that different systems of geometries are conceptually equally possible…. Identically, there are different logics.". (shrink)

Most advice for sharpening our thinking skills concerns how to avoid bad arguments. But argument is only one of the two basic forms of reasoning. The other is explanation, and it is equally susceptible to abuse. You may already be familiar with certain forms of explanatory malfeasance. One of the best known is circular explanation, in which the stated cause is just a different way of describing the effect. Here I'd like to introduce you to a less appreciated error of (...) explanation. To my knowledge it has no widely accepted name, but I call it ???the convincing explanation??? (shrink)

The Fourth Edition of this bestselling, highly regarded book has been fully revised to incorporate changes in law and clinical guidance making a vital impact on patient management, encompassing: The Equalities Act 2010 which provides a right of older people to treatment without discrimination ; Case law on withdrawing nutrition and hydration ; Updated guidance on resuscitation from the Resuscitation Council, the British Medical Association and the Royal College of Nursing ; The redefining of good medical practice by the General (...) Medical Council ; The abolition of the Liverpool Care Pathway with an updated guidance on end of life care and advance care planning. Expanded throughout, this new edition also integrates two entirely new chapters covering testamentary capacity and role of the physician, and religious beliefs and end of life issues. Its practical, reflective and informative approach continue to make it essential reading for all health professionals, particularly trainees, involved in making difficult decisions in the care of older persons. It is also highly recommended for undergraduate medical students. (shrink)

Meditation has been for long time avoided as a scientific theme because of its complexity and its religious connotations. Fortunately, in the last years, it has increasingly been studied within different neuroscientific experimental protocols. Attention and concentration are surely among the most important topics in these experiments. Notwithstanding this, inhibition of emotions and discursive thoughts are equally important to understand what is at stake during those types of mental processes. I philosophically and technically analyse and compare results from neuroimaging studies, (...) produced by leading authorities on the theme, dealing with two types of meditation: "one-pointed concentration" and "compassion meditation". Analysing "one-pointed concentration", I show the differences between novice and expert meditation practitioners in terms of brain activity and connectivity, considering the relationship among increased attention and concentration and decreased activity in areas related to discursive thought and emotion. Analysing "compassion meditation", I show the importance of the limbic circuitry in emotion sharing. I follow the same strategy of comparing novice and expert meditation practitioners. The conclusion establishes a common structure to those different ways of dealing with emotion during meditation. (shrink)

It is commonly the case that a problem concerning a mathematical or physical system can be solved in two quite different ways--by an internal or an external approach. For example, the area of a triangle can be found by integration or by showing it to be half that of a certain rectangle. In general, the first approach is, to analyse the given system into component parts, and the second approach is to deal with the system as a whole. It seems (...) that even in cases where solutions to physical problems obtained according to these two approaches are equally valid, and are equally good as explanations, scientists prefer the solution obtained by the internal approach. The reasons for this preference are examined. And it is suggested that whatever the reasons, this preference may have been partly responsible for the 19th century preference for the Kinetic Theory rather than Thermodynamics. (shrink)